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a b s t r a c t
Assessing the trustworthiness of sensor data and transmitters of this data is critical for
quality assurance. Trust evaluation frameworks utilize data provenance along with the
sensed data values to compute the trustworthiness of each data item. However, in a sizeable multi-hop sensor network, provenance information requires a large and variable number of bits in each packet, resulting in high energy dissipation due to the extended period of
radio communication. In this paper, we design energy-efﬁcient provenance encoding and
construction schemes, which we refer to as Probabilistic Provenance Flow (PPF). Our work
demonstrates the feasibility of adapting the Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) technique
in IP traceback to wireless sensor networks. We design two bit-efﬁcient provenance encoding schemes along with a complementary vanilla scheme. Depending on the network size
and bit budget, we select the best method based on mathematical approximations and
numerical analysis. We integrate PPF with provenance-based trust frameworks and investigate the trade-off between trustworthiness of data items and transmission overhead. We
conduct TOSSIM simulations with realistic wireless links, and perform testbed experiments
on 15–20 TelosB motes to demonstrate the effectiveness of PPF. Our results show that the
encoding schemes of PPF have identical performance with a low bit budget (32-bit),
requiring 33% fewer packets and 30% less energy than PPM variants to construct provenance. With a twofold increase in bit budget, PPF with the selected encoding scheme
reduces energy consumption by 46–60%.
Ó 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
New micro-sensors have enabled wireless sensor networks (WSNs) to gather real-time data from the physical
world [1,2]. Planet-wide sensor networks [3,4], sensor networks for large-scale urban environments [5], and physical
infrastructure systems [6] indicate potential deployments
of multi-hop networks consisting of hundreds of sensor
nodes. In such networks, data produced by the sensors
are collected at the base station and made available to
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 765 337 6447.
E-mail addresses: alams@purdue.edu (S.M.Iftekharul Alam), fahmy@
cs.purdue.edu (S. Fahmy)alams@purdue.edu (S.M.I. Alam), fahmy@cs.
purdue.edu (S. Fahmy).
1570-8705/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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decision makers for further analysis. As the quality of
decision making is critically dependent on the quality of
transmitted information [5], trustworthiness of information and information-transmitting nodes is important [7].
In a multi-hop network, provenance includes knowledge
of the originator and processing path of data since its generation. While a few provenance-based trust evaluation
frameworks have been proposed [8,9], they do not consider
energy dissipation due to provenance transmission.
Provenance of a data item can be represented by a tree
that is embedded as meta-data with the item, and updated along the path used to forward the item to the base
station [9]. In this case, every intermediate node carries
provenance of length proportional to the hop count
between that node and the originator of the data item.
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In a network with a large diameter (hop count), this
increased meta-data length results in an extended period
of radio communication and energy dissipation at every
intermediate node. We consider a real deployment of a
46-hop network [10] in our simulations, and observe that
aggregated energy dissipation of the network increases by
27% when a traditional trust framework is employed.
Although large networks can be hierarchically organized
[11], they still require a signiﬁcant number of hops [12],
with non-negligible energy usage for provenance
transmission.
Provenance encoding and construction is similar in
nature to the well-known IP traceback problem [13,14]. IP
traceback aims to determine the forwarding paths of
spoofed packets in the Internet. Among the many proposed
solutions to this problem, Probabilistic Packet Marking
(PPM) can most easily be adapted to WSNs [15]. We have
shown that direct application of PPM to WSNs is infeasible
since it embeds a single node identiﬁer in each packet, and
hence requires a large number of packets to construct the
forwarding path [16]. Instead, we propose a new approach,
Probabilistic Provenance Flow (PPF), where a connected
subgraph of the forwarding path is probabilistically
embedded into a packet. PPF includes three new bit-efﬁcient provenance encoding schemes that quickly construct
provenance of an arbitrarily large multi-hop network.
We integrate a simple but robust scheme into PPF to
handle topological changes. Since encoded provenance is
matched against previously constructed provenance
graphs at the base station, we can reduce decoding errors
to negligible levels and speed up convergence. We also
integrate PPF with provenance-based trust frameworks
and explore how trust scores evolve faster with data items
having dissimilar provenance than with the items having
shared provenance. This study exposes the trade-off between trustworthiness or provenance dissimilarity of data
items and transmission overhead: making provenance
more dissimilar increases transmission overhead. We
investigate this trade-off and propose a solution to provide
decision makers with a tunable parameter to control the
extent of provenance dissimilarity and transmission
overhead.
We perform extensive simulations using TOSSIM to
demonstrate the performance of PPF in a highly dynamic
and asymmetric network. We further evaluate PPF using
a testbed consisting of 15–20 TelosB motes in different
settings. Our simulation and testbed results show that
PPF with the selected encoding scheme can consume up
to 46–60% less energy and converge with 45% fewer
packets than the traditional approach, which signiﬁcantly
increases the network life-time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
formulate the problem of energy-efﬁcient provenance
transmission in Section 2. Section 3 discusses related work.
Section 4 explains three different encoding schemes for
PPF. We discuss the corresponding approaches to decode
and construct provenance in Section 5. Section 6 discusses
integration of PPF with provenance-based trust frameworks. In Section 7, we examine the parameter selection
for one of the encoding methods. We analyze the bit
requirements for embedding provenance using all
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encoding schemes in Section 8. Sections 9 and 10 present
simulation and testbed results, respectively. Finally,
Section 11 concludes the paper.
2. Problem formulation
2.1. Network model
We consider a multi-hop WSN where changes in topology due to failure or mobility can occur, but are infrequent.
We make the following assumptions regarding the network and trafﬁc:
(1) A Base Station (BS) acts as a central command
authority and the root of a routing tree. It has no
resource constraints and cannot be compromised by
an attacker.
(2) Sensor nodes monitor their surroundings and periodically report to the base station or their designated
cluster head (if any).
(3) Multiple sensors are used to monitor an event.
Within a particular time window, independent observations obtained at cluster heads (if any) or the base station from different sensors are concerned with the same
event.
(4) A provenance-based trust management method
such as [8,9] is used in the application layer to evaluate
and manage trust in an adaptive manner. More details
can be found in [17].
2.2. Problem statement
We consider a network of N nodes, where the maximum
length (depth) of any forwarding path (tree) is L. Assume
that the maximum number of bits that can be used to
embed provenance information in a single packet is B.
Based on this bit budget, there is an integer m; 1 < m 6 L
such that at most m consecutive node identities (that is,
m  1 consecutive edges) can be embedded into a single
packet. We must perform the following operations:
(1) Provenance embedding: In a forwarding tree
G ¼ ðV; EÞ rooted at the base station, each node ni 2 V
makes an independent decision whether to embed its
identity into the packet, starting a connected sub-graph,
with probability pi . We need to design a provenance
embedding method to carry a partial path
P ¼< ni1 ; ni2 ; . . . nim > into a single packet where
nij 2 V; 1 6 j 6 m and ðnik ; nikþ1 Þ 2 E; 1 6 k 6 m  1. This
problem is a simple extension of the edge sampling
approach in IP traceback [13].
(2) Provenance construction: At the base station, we
must construct the entire provenance tree G ¼ ðV; EÞ
by exploiting partial path information collected from a
number of received packets, with an upper bound on
the number of packets required to construct the
provenance.
(3) Provenance evolution: After topological changes,
e.g., due to failures or mobility, we must bound the time
that it takes to reﬂect the changes in the constructed
provenance.
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(4) Provenance delivery: We must specify interfaces or
methods to deliver the constructed provenance to an
existing provenance-based trust framework.

into a packet probabilistically and only differ in how they
encode these identiﬁers.
4.1. Juxtaposition of ranks

3. Related work
Few provenance-based trust frameworks have been
proposed to date [8,9]. These frameworks do not consider
energy-efﬁciency in WSNs.
The problem of provenance transmission is related to
the IP traceback problem that determines the forwarding
path of spoofed packets [18]. IP traceback methods include
hop-by-hop tracing [19,20], out-of-band ICMP traceback
[21], and in-band probabilistic packet marking [13,14].
Hop-by-hop tracing is not well-suited to WSNs due to its
large storage requirement. Hot-spot based traceback methods designed for mobile ad hoc networks [22,23] store
packet information at the nodes, and traceback is performed hop-by-hop to determine the hot-spot where the
attacker is located. In our case, provenance information is
continuously required at the base station to compute trust
scores of descendant nodes. Hot-spot based methods
would incur unnecessary delay in trust score calculation.
Out-of-band ICMP traceback requires out-of-band communication and increased bandwidth which limit its usability
in resource-constrained WSNs.
In this work, we adapt Probabilistic Packet Marking
(PPM) since it does not require additional storage or outof-band communication. PPM assumes static routes which
may not hold in our case. Additionally, PPM requires a signiﬁcant number of packets to construct the forwarding
path. Network coding variants of PPM [24,25] require fewer packets to construct the forwarding path. Network coding approaches, however, have a high computational
complexity and increase the length of the packet, as marking coefﬁcients are transmitted with the packet. Cheng
et al. [26] determine the optimal marking probability for
each node to reduce the number of packets required to
construct the forwarding path.
Multi-hop Network Tomography (MNT) [27] is a recently proposed algorithm for reconstructing the packet
path, the per-hop arrival order, and the per-hop arrival
timing of individual packets. The algorithm is, however,
particularly designed for networks where nodes have
the dual functionality of both generating and forwarding
packets. In contrast, our approach is more generic and
does not make speciﬁc assumptions about the roles of
nodes.
Sultana et al. [28] proposed a secure provenance
scheme for wireless sensor networks that uses in-packet
Bloom ﬁlters to encode provenance. However, even for a
14-hop path, their scheme requires 240 bits to embed
provenance information. This limits the practical usability
of this scheme in large scale multi-hop networks.

In the rank method, instead of embedding the node ID
directly into a packet, rank(ID) (deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1 below) of the node is embedded, since every node ID is uniquely identiﬁable by its rank, and the rank would need
fewer bits than the identity.
Deﬁnition 1. Consider U ¼ fID1 ; ID2 ; . . . IDN g as the set of N
node IDs. There is a permutation of U; rðUÞ ¼ fIDa1 ; IDa2 ; . . .
IDaN g, such that, IDaj < IDajþ1 , for 1 6 j 6 N  1. Rank of any
node ID, IDi 2 U, denoted as rankðIDi Þ, is the position of IDi
in rðUÞ.
Assume that the packet meta-data has space to hold
identities of up to m nodes. We use a counter of log2 m bits
to track the number of already embedded ranks in the
packet. Initially, the buffer and counter contain zeroes.
Every node ni decides to start a connected sub-graph with
probability pi . Once it decides to do so, it overwrites the
previous information by doing the following: it zeroes
out the entire provenance ﬁeld and then embeds its rank
at the beginning of the buffer and sets the counter to
one. If a node decides not to overwrite, it checks for empty
buffer space using the counter ﬁeld. If there is space, it
adds its rank into the ﬁrst available slot in the buffer and
increments the counter. Fig. 1 shows an example of this
method where the buffer space can hold at most three
node identities in a single packet.
4.2. Prime multiplication
Our second encoding scheme, the prime method, is
based on prime multiplication. In a reasonably large network, this method can embed more node IDs within same
number of bits (on the average), compared to the rank
method. To the best of our knowledge, this method has
not been used in any prior work.
Deﬁnition 2. Let Pn be the largest prime number that is
less than or equal to the positive integer n. We deﬁne the
set of usable IDs, Q P;s where P is a prime number and s is a
positive integer:

Q P;s ¼ fn 2 Nj2 6 n 6 P and 0 6 n  Pn 6 sg:
Deﬁnition 3. For any positive integer n 2 Q P;s , for some P
and s, we deﬁne two functions:

Decision: Overwrite

Not Overwrite

6

5

4. Probabilistic provenance embedding
In this section, we present three provenance embedding
schemes as part of our Probabilistic Provenance Flow (PPF)
approach. All three methods incorporate node identiﬁers

5
Ranks

01

56

Not Overwrite

Overwrite

Not Overwrite

19

20

7
10

5 6 7

11

19

01

19 20

10

Binary counter

Fig. 1. Provenance encoding using juxtaposition of ranks (numbers
inscribed in the circles indicate rank of nodes).
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 primeðnÞ ¼ P n (the largest prime number that is less
than or equal to n).
 offsetðnÞ ¼ n  Pn .
The prime method is motivated by the idea of using
prime numbers as node IDs and encoding a set of IDs
through their multiplication which can be uniquely factorized. However, prime multiplication incurs computational
and spatial overhead when the participating prime numbers become larger. As shown in Table 1, the average number of bits required to multiply m prime numbers increases
with the increasing size of the domain of these numbers.
This shows the infeasibility of using prime numbers directly as node IDs. Thus, we deﬁne Q P;s (Deﬁnition 2) to ensure that node IDs will not differ by more than s from their
nearest prime numbers where s is referred as the spread
factor. Then, we encode a sequence of node IDs by multiplying their nearest prime numbers and summing up the
corresponding offset values (Deﬁnition 3). Before describing the details of encoding process, we describe the assignment of node IDs using set Q P;s .
4.2.1. Node ID assignment
For a network of N nodes, we pick a set
Q P;s ¼ fq1 ; q2 ; . . . qz g with the smallest z such that z P N.
An in-place algorithm is used to produce a random permutation of Q P;s ; rðQ P;s Þ ¼ fqa1 ; qa2 ; . . . qaz g and members of
rðQ P;s Þ are assigned to all N nodes sequentially. For example,
in an 8-node network, we can pick IDs for the nodes from a
random permutation of Q 11;7 ¼ f2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11g.
For a given number of nodes (N), the bit requirements
for prime multiplication increase the most when s ¼ 0,
which makes Q P;s nothing but a set of prime numbers that
are less than or equal to P (=Nth prime number). With an
increasing value of s, the set Q P;s can contain numbers
upper-bound by relatively smaller value of P (Nth prime
number). By tuning s, the largest element (P) of Q P;s can be
made close to the total number of nodes (N). This brings
about an interesting trade-off: reduction of the number
of bits required for prime multiplication versus increase
in the number of bits required for summation of offsets.
We will investigate this trade-off in Section 7.
4.2.2. Encoding process
To store provenance information, we divide the provenance buffer into two parts: product and offset. Every node
ni has an ID, say IDi , that is a member of Q P;s for some P and
s. As with the rank method, once a node ni decides to start a
connected sub-graph, it clears the provenance buffer. It

Table 1
Bit requirements for multiplication of m node IDs, picked randomly from
the ﬁrst f prime numbers.
f

500
1000
2000
5000

m¼3

m¼4

m¼6

Avg

Max

Avg

Max

Avg

Max

30.80
34.25
37.82
42.33

36
39
42
47

40.76
45.35
49.84
55.83

47
52
56
62

59.82
67.02
73.64
82.45

69
76
83
93

then inserts primeðIDi Þ into the product part and offsetðIDi Þ
into the offset part (Deﬁnition 3). If a node nj decides not to
overwrite, it retrieves the values stored in the product and
offset parts. It then multiplies the value of the product with
primeðIDj Þ, adds offsetðIDj Þ to the offset, and stores the newly calculated values into the respective parts. Fig. 2 shows
an example with m ¼ 2.
We no longer need a counter ﬁeld to track the number of
node identities encoded in the provenance buffer because
there is always a unique prime factorization of the product
part which gives the number of participating nodes.
4.3. Rabin ﬁngerprints
The prime method can typically accommodate more
node identities (m) than the rank method, but prime multiplication results increase in size as N and m increase. In
order to embed more node IDs into a single packet without
requiring additional bits and excessive computational
complexity, we investigate Rabin ﬁngerprints [29].
A Rabin ﬁngerprint calculates a near-perfect and spaceefﬁcient unique representation of a sequence of bits. For
a sequence of bits n1 ; n2 ; . . . nm , of length m, the Rabin
ﬁngerprint is given by the following expression, where a
and M are constant integers:

RFðn1 ; n2 ; . . . nm Þ ¼ ðn1 am1 þ n2 am2 þ . . . þ nm Þmod M:
The ﬁngerprint of the concatenation of two sequences X
and Y can be computed as follows:

RFðXjjYÞ ¼ RFðRFðXÞjjYÞ ¼ RFðRFðXÞ  al Þ þ RFðYÞ
where, jj represents concatenation and l is the length of Y.
4.3.1. Encoding ﬁngerprints
The partial path traversed by a packet can be considered
as a bit sequence of IDs of the nodes on that partial path.
We aim at transmitting the ﬁngerprint of that bit sequence
instead of transmitting the actual sequence. Every node
uses two constant integers a and M to compute its ﬁngerprint. As the packet traverses the path, we could easily
compute the contribution of every node to the ﬁngerprint
and add it to the contributions of its predecessor nodes
on that path. For example, if the packet traverses the
partial path < n1 ; n2 ; . . . nm >, node ni ; 1 6 i 6 m has a
contribution of IDi abðmiþ1Þ to the ﬁngerprint associated
with that path. Here, b is the number of bits required to
represent a single ID. However, the incremental sum of
these contributions requires a large and variable number
of bits in the packet which is undesirable. Hence, we exploit the concatenation property of Rabin ﬁngerprints,
which allows any node nk to compute the ﬁngerprint of
node IDs from IDn1 to IDnk by concatenating its own ID
(IDnk ) to the ﬁngerprint value of previous nodes IDn1 to
IDnk1 . The following equation makes this claim clear:

RFðIDn1 ; IDn2 ; . . . IDnk Þ ¼ RFðRFðIDn1 ; IDn2 ; . . . IDnk1 ÞjjIDnk Þ:
ð1Þ
Thus, every node on a path can update the ﬁngerprint
without requiring any extra bits as the ﬁngerprint value
is always less than the divisor M. Note that since we
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Decision:

5

Overwrite

Not Overwrite

5

4

0

Prime multiplication

5x3

Not Overwrite

25
0+1

5x3x23

0+1+2

17

Overwrite

Not Overwrite

18

30
1

17x29

Not Overwrite

9
1+1

17x29x7

1+1+2

Offset

Fig. 2. Provenance encoding using prime multiplication (numbers inscribed in the circles indicate ID of nodes).

perform all arithmetic operations over Z2 , the concatenation operation and ﬁngerprint calculation (which require
only shift and XOR operations) can be performed in linear
time [30]. The time complexity to calculate ﬁngerprints
can be further improved by using a pre-computed lookup
table as discussed in Appendix A.
To store provenance information, we divide the provenance buffer into three ﬁelds: ﬁngerprint, intermediate
node, and length. As in other PPF methods, every node ni
decides to start a connected sub-graph with probability
pi . Once it decides to do so, it clears the buffer and inserts
IDi and 1 into the ﬁngerprint and length ﬁelds, respectively. If a node nj decides not to overwrite, it retrieves
the values stored in the ﬁngerprint and length ﬁelds. If
the length is less than m, it updates the current ﬁngerprint
value (say X) by computing RFðXjjIDj Þ and increments the
current value of the length ﬁeld by one. If the newly
computed length is less than or equal to m; IDj is stored
in the intermediate node ﬁeld that will aid in decoding
the provenance as discussed later.
4.3.2. Partitioning ﬁngerprints
Since we need to exploit previous knowledge about
node ordering to retrieve provenance information from
the ﬁngerprint (as we will discuss in the next section),
transmitting large partial provenance information using
ﬁngerprints may not always be advantageous. In WSNs,
nodes are vulnerable and error-prone and the routing path
may change due to the lossy nature of the wireless medium. This may cause inconsistency between the current
and the previously stored ordering among nodes, making
the entire ﬁngerprint-based provenance information useless. To mitigate this problem, we divide the ﬁngerprint
ﬁeld into rðr > 1Þ parts around the ðr  1Þ intermediate
nodes so that changes in ordering in one part do not affect
other parts and changes in ordering can be reﬂected.
Each part contains ﬁngerprints of at most dmþr1
e node
r
IDs where the length ﬁeld indicates the total number of
participating node IDs. For example, assume we wish to
embed information about a partial path < n1 ; n2 ; . . . nm >
into a single packet with m ¼ 7 and r ¼ 2. As the packet
traverses the network, node n4 becomes the intermediate
node and the ﬁrst part of the ﬁngerprint contains
RFðID1 ; ID2 ; ID3 ; ID4 Þ and the second part contains
RFðID4 ; ID5 ; ID6 ; ID7 Þ.
Both parts of the ﬁngerprint are calculated according to
Eq. (1) and the length ﬁeld indicates the combined length
of the both parts. Note that, a non-partitioned ﬁngerprint
is a special case where the intermediate node corresponds
to the lone ﬁngerprint. Fig. 3(a) depicts an example of the
non-partitioned case and Fig. 3(b) depicts the partitioning
approach with m ¼ 5 and r ¼ 2.

4.4. Handling link changes
The decoding process for prime and ﬁngerprint methods requires a priori knowledge of order of nodes (as discussed in Section 5). Since topological changes are
prevalent in wireless sensor networks, we need to keep
node order information up-to-date so that the prime and
ﬁngerprint encoding methods can correctly decode provenance. A straightforward solution is to invoke the rank approach every tembedding seconds. A small value of t embedding
reduces the beneﬁts of applying the bit-efﬁcient prime
and ﬁngerprint methods, while longer t embedding increases
decoding error and reduces the overall effectiveness of
the trust framework.
To study link change, we conduct a simple simulation
experiment. Fig. 4 shows a snapshot of link changes for
2000 packets transmitted from a source to the base station
in a highly asymmetric 10  10 grid network. Here link
change for a packet denotes the number of next hop
changes on the way from the source to the base station
with respect to the path followed by the preceding packet.
We observe that the time interval between two successive
topological changes varies, making it difﬁcult to choose a
ﬁxed value for t embedding . Thus, we design a reactive approach (shown in Fig. 5) to handle link changes by exploiting next hop information available from the network layer.
The goal of our approach is to rapidly detect changes and to
transmit provenance of nodes that are part of the changed
links with order information among them.
Each node maintains a parent list containing its most recent next hops (towards the base station). When a forwarder node receives a packet, it updates this list if the
current next hop is not present in the list. It also switches
a single bit (which we call path changed) in the provenance
ﬁeld of the packet to 1 and embeds the rank of its own ID
as provenance. Every node receiving the packet with the
path changed bit set to 1 concatenates the rank of its ID
with the existing provenance information in the packet.
Note that once the path changed bit of a packet is set to
1, no forwarder node is allowed to override the provenance
information which makes transmission of provenance of
changed links the highest priority. If the current next hop
is present in the parent list, the node can follow any of
the probabilistic encoding schemes discussed earlier.
We recommend that the size of the parent list of a node
be computed as a function of the number of neighboring
nodes, the rate of link changes, and the packet reception rate
(PRR) at the base station for that node. When PRR at the
base station for a node is low, topological change information passed from that node may be lost. With a smaller
parent list, the node will record fewer next hop changes
out of the lost ones. This increases the probability of
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Number of changes in hop count

Fig. 3. Provenance encoding using Rabin ﬁngerprints (numbers inscribed in the circles indicate ID of nodes). (a) Embedding provenance with nonpartitioned ﬁngerprint. (b) Embedding provenance with m ¼ 5 and r ¼ 2.
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Fig. 4. Snapshot of topological changes for 2000 packets in a 10  10 grid
network.

retransmitting lost topological change information in a
subsequent packet. If the rate of link change is low, a smaller parent list for a node sufﬁces as well. When PRR at the
base station for a node is good, a larger parent list allows a
node to record more next hop changes and ensures faster
transition to probabilistic encoding schemes. In our simulation experiments, we found that the performance of
PPF is not highly sensitive to the size of the parent list,
and chose g for a g  g grid network.
Although our proposed topological change handling
scheme requires an extra bit in the provenance ﬁeld, it offers several advantages:
 Topological changes are rapidly propagated and
reﬂected in the provenance graph constructed at the
base station.
 Rank-based decoding can be used to decode the provenance information of a packet with the path changed bit
set to 1.
 Nodes can automatically utilize an efﬁcient encoding
scheme (e.g., prime or ﬁngerprint) as soon as no further
topological changes are observed.
5. Decoding and constructing provenance
The provenance buffer of a packet is examined at the base
station to retrieve the embedded partial provenance (or path)
information. With the rank embedding approach, we can easily extract the embedded identities from the provenance buffer, since we have the length ﬁeld, and the rank of each node
ID uses a ﬁxed number of bits. However, with both the prime
and ﬁngerprint embedding methods, we assume that information about ordering among nodes is known from a previously constructed provenance graph, Gpre ¼ ðV pre ; Epre Þ. Here,
V pre is the set of node IDs and Epre is the set of edges among
these nodes indicating provenance ﬂow.
5.1. Decoding process for prime method

Fig. 5. Handling topological changes in an intermediate node.

We apply a standard prime factorization algorithm over
the product part of the provenance buffer to retrieve the
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set of nearest prime numbers (say, X ¼ fX 1 ; X 2 ; . . . X m g).
Then, we use Depth-First-Search (DFS) with backtracking
over Gpre to ﬁnd all the possible paths consisting of m node
IDs whose nearest prime numbers form any permutation
of X. We need to modify DFS to compare the nearest prime
number to a particular node ID with the members of set X
while visiting that node, and track the offset of the ID when
a match is found. With this modiﬁcation, DFS with backtracking outputs all possible sets of node IDs whose nearest prime numbers form a permutation of X. Since every
ID does not differ from its nearest prime number by more
than s, we can ﬁnd at most sm such sets. For each such set,
we sum up the offset values and calculate the difference
from the offset value retrieved from the received packet.
If the difference is zero, we record the matched set as the
retrieved provenance.
5.2. Decoding process for ﬁngerprint method
Upon reception of a packet, we retrieve the r ﬁngerprint(s), associated intermediate node ID(s), and the length
ﬁeld indicating the number of participating node IDs. For
every intermediate node, IDi ; 1 6 i 6 r  1, we perform a
DFS with backtracking over Gpre ¼ ðV pre ; Epre Þ with the
following modiﬁcations:
 Set IDi is the root for DFS with backtracking.
 Search all the nodes within dmþr1
e hops away from the
r
node IDi and compute the Rabin ﬁngerprint using a precomputed lookup table as discussed in Appendix A.
 After computing every ﬁngerprint of length dmþr1
e, we
r
compare them to the retrieved ﬁngerprints RF i and
RF iþ1 . If a match is found, we record the matched path
as provenance of the received packet.
Note that, for every intermediate node, we are searching a smaller portion of the graph Gpre using DFS with
backtracking.
5.2.1. False positive rate for ﬁngerprints
Assume that we have at most x ¼ dmþr1
e node IDs per
r
partition, where m is the total number of node IDs embedded per packet. Since decoding each pair of partitions is
independent of others, it sufﬁces to analyze the false
positive probability of ﬁngerprinting a path of x node IDs
originating from a particular intermediate node ID. Assume
that there are n such paths in the provenance graph. Then,
2

the false positive probability is 6 n 2x:b
k , where k is the number of bits used for ﬁngerprinting and b is the length of the
bit representation of one node ID.
If the maximum fan-out of the network is f, then n is
upper-bound by f x1 which gives,
False positiv e probability 6

f 2ðx1Þ x:b
k

2

¼

bðm þ r  1Þf
k

2ðm1Þ
r

ð2Þ

r:2

5.3. Construction of provenance
Depending on the network characteristics and bit
budget, decision makers may choose one of the three

provenance encoding schemes as the default one. When a
packet is received at the base station, the path changed
bit of the packet is checked to determine the encoding
method that was used to embed provenance. If the path
changed bit is set to 1, provenance (i.e. partial forwarding
path) of the received packet is extracted using the decoding process of rank approach. Otherwise, the decoding process for the default scheme is used to extract embedded
provenance.
Fig. 6 shows a block diagram of provenance construction using PPF. The process of provenance construction
maintains two data structures: (i) G ¼ ðV; EÞ representing
the current provenance graph and (ii) Gpre ðV pre ; Epre Þ
encompassing previously constructed provenance. Once
we have decoded partial path information from the received packet, provenance construction is straightforward.
After collecting sufﬁcient packets with embedded provenance (i.e., when we have at least one ID from each node),
we combine the partial paths to produce the complete
provenance graph, G ¼ ðV; EÞ. Here, V is the set of nodes
and for some v i 2 V; v j 2 V; ðv i ; v j Þ 2 Eiff ðIDi ; IDj Þ belongs
to some partial provenance encoded in a received packet.
Before the next round of provenance construction, we set
V pre ¼ V pre [ V and Epre ¼ Epre [ E to update Gpre ðV pre ; Epre Þ
which is used by the decoding processes of prime and ﬁngerprint methods. Note that the initial G is constructed
from the partial provenance embedded in the packets carrying changed path information (path changed bit 1) only.
With the prime and ﬁngerprint approaches, decoding
errors can occur when a packet carrying changed path
information is lost in the network and the base station is
unaware of the changes. Subsequently sent packets containing encoded information of the changed path will
cause decoding errors at the base station. Further processing can be employed to recover from these errors, such as
checking other combinations of partial paths by checking
edges between nodes on the recorded path and the nodes
that are 1 or 2-hop away from them. These extensions will
be the subject of our future work.
5.4. Complexity analysis
Decoding using the rank method is straightforward and
takes only OðmÞ time, where m is the maximum number of
nodes embedded per packet.
In case of the prime method, we use the General Number Field Sieve (GNFS) algorithm for prime factorization.
The asymptotic running time for this algorithm for a


1
2
b-bit number is O expðð64b
Þ3 ðlog bÞ3 Þ .
9
In an N-node network, node IDs require at most dlog2 Ne
bits with the appropriate choice of s and m. Thus,
multiplication of m node IDs requires at most mdlog2 Ne
bits which makes the complexity of prime factorization



1
2
64mdlog2 Ne 3
3
O exp
ðlogðmdlog
NeÞÞ
.
2
9
We also need to perform DFS with backtracking. This
entails sm comparisons to ﬁnd a path of m nodes (Section
N
5.1). We know that s can be approximated as pðNÞ
 ln N
(as discussed in the next section). Thus, the time required
to decode provenance from a single packet becomes
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Fig. 6. Construction of provenance and integration with trust framework.

!

1
2
64mdlog2 Ne 3
3
Oðexp
ðlogðmdlog2 NeÞÞ þ expðNÞ
9
m

þ ðln NÞ Þ
which is exponential in terms of N.
In case of the ﬁngerprint method, we need to search the
provenance graph and update the ﬁngerprint using concatenation while visiting a node on that graph. This is performed using DFS with backtracking which takes
exponential time in terms of N in the worst case. However,
nodes beyond dmþr1
e-hops away from the root can be
r
pruned in this case. Thus the actual number of nodes visited by the algorithm is much lower in practice.
Regarding the construction of entire provenance in an
N-node network, we can represent the provenance graph
using an adjacency matrix. The total number of edges of
the graph can be at most OðN 2 Þ. Since edge insertion requires constant time, the worst case complexity for constructing the entire provenance is OðN 2 Þ. We need OðN 2 Þ
space to hold the provenance graph apart from the space
required by the trust framework. Alternatively, we can
use an adjacency list, which offers a different tradeoff.
6. Trust framework and PPF
In order to assess the trustworthiness of a data item,
traditional trust frameworks associate a trust score with
each data item. Although the actual meaning of the trust
score varies from application to application, this score
can be used for comparison or ranking [9]. The data item
having the highest trust score value can be labeled as the
most trustworthy item with respect to other data items.
Here we borrow the deﬁnition of trust of a data item given
in [8]: ‘‘The trust of a data item i, denoted as TðiÞ, is the
probability of i being true, as perceived by the receiver.’’
Provenance-based trust frameworks compute trust
scores over a collection of data items based on their values
and provenance information. These data items pertain to
the same physical event and are received at the base station within a speciﬁed time window. The trust score of
each data item, TðiÞ is adjusted based on the value similarity
and provenance dissimilarity of the data items. If similar
data values have different provenance, this may increase
the trustworthiness of data items. If the two data items
have different provenance, they can be considered
supportive to each other. In contrast, if they share similar
provenance, this is not a clear indication of trustworthi-

ness. Thus both value similarity and provenance dissimilarity
of a data item contribute to its trust score.
PPF is agnostic of the way provenance dissimilarity is calculated under different trust frameworks. In order for us to
explain the interface between PPF and trust frameworks,
we consider the following deﬁnition of provenance dissimilarity score (qd ), a variant of the path difference factor proposed in [8]:

P

qd ¼

qðd; tÞ
jCj  1

t2C;t–d

where C denotes a collection of data items and qðd; tÞ
indicates provenance difference between two data items
d and t.

qðd; tÞ ¼

maxfjGd j; jGt jg  jIfGd ; Gt gj
maxfjGd j; jGt jg

Here, Gd and Gt indicate provenance corresponding to the
data items d and t, and IfGd ; Gt g indicates set of nodes that
are common to Gd and Gt .
6.1. Integration with trust framework
For a given collection of data items, trust frameworks
require the complete provenance of each data item to calculate provenance dissimilarity score. Unfortunately, PPF
only typically provides partial provenance of each data
item. The partial provenance of a data item provided by
PPF is either a part of the previously constructed complete
forwarding path or a part of a new forwarding path that
will be followed by the data items of the same source in
near future. Thus after decoding partial provenance
fIDi1 ; IDi2 ; . . . IDim g of a data item (originated from source
i), PPF returns its complete provenance to the trust framework as follows:
 Find paths from source i to IDi1 and from IDim to the base
station on the current provenance graph G. If no
such paths are found on G, continue searching over
the graph Gpre .
 Concatenate the above paths with the decoded partial
paths to form complete provenance for the received
data item.
Provenance constructed in this manner provide near
perfect accuracy in trust score calculation as we will
observe in our simulation results (Section 6.1).
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6.2. Trustworthiness versus transmission overhead
Since sensor nodes are deployed near the phenomena
to be sensed [31], data items with similar values are
likely to share forwarding paths (or provenance). However, in an ideal (i.e., attack free) environment, trust
scores evolve faster with data items having dissimilar
provenance than with the items having shared provenance [9]. Dissimilar provenance of a collection of data
items may help reduce the severity of an attack because
a single attacker cannot be present on multiple forwarding paths at the same time. For example, if we consider an
adversary model where multiple attackers chain along a
path and forward packets selectively [32], most of the
data items sharing that forwarding path will be affected.
In a threat model where multiple attackers collude to inject false data [33], similar provenance of data items
helps locate the attack region faster. Thus, it is desirable
to control the forwarding path of data items so that
required similarity or dissimilarity among provenance
can be ensured.
Forwarding paths are deﬁned and maintained by the
routing protocols on the sensor nodes. These paths or
routes are usually built as part of a minimum cost tree
rooted at the base station. In routing terminology, the
cost for a node is the cost for its next hop plus the cost
of its link to the next hop. Thus the cost of a route is
the sum of the costs of its links towards the base station.
Assuming expected transmissions (ETX) [34] as a cost
metric, a forwarder node will route the data item through
the next hop that requires the least estimated number of
transmissions (to reach the base station) with respect to
other neighbors. In this case, choosing a next hop
other than the default one would result in a different forwarding path with a higher ETX value. This reveals an
interesting trade-off between trustworthiness (or provenance dissimilarity) and transmission overhead: making
provenance more dissimilar increases transmission
overhead.
We propose a solution (termed as controlled routing)
integrated with the default TinyOS routing protocol (CTP)
to provide decision makers with a tunable parameter to
control the extent of provenance dissimilarity and transmission overhead. Before forwarding a packet, the next
hop function of the CTP routing engine is used to determine
the best next hop (i.e., neighbor with the smallest ETX) out
of the routing table of the forwarder. Our solution overrides this function with a parameterized next hop function
which takes an argument called ETX threshold (thetx ) and
performs following steps:
 Before forwarding a packet, we examine the routing
table of the forwarder node to determine a list of eligible next hops. We discard neighboring nodes that create
self-loops and have estimated ETX beyond the smallest
ETX by more than thetx .
 We hash on the ID of the originator node of the packet
to generate a value i between 1 and the number of eligible next hops. The ith next hop in the eligible next hop
list is returned as the output of the function.

Choosing next hop based on the hash value of the originator node ID keeps the forwarding path of the data items
(generated from that node) consistent and makes the solution more tailored to the PPF encoding schemes. Further,
by increasing the value of thetx , we can increase the degree
of dissimilarity among provenance of a collection of data
items at the cost of higher transmission overhead, and vice
versa.
7. Spread factor
The prime method requires two parameters s and P that
deﬁne the set of node IDs, Q P;s .
7.1. Approximating the spread factor
For a given number of nodes, N, we want to determine
the spread factor, s that minimizes the highest value of
Q P;s . This value of s depends on the prime gap.
Deﬁnition 4. A prime gap is the difference between two
successive prime numbers, pk and pðkþ1Þ , where pk is the
kth prime number. Thus, a prime gap of length n is a run of
n  1 consecutive composite numbers between two successive primes.
We use the Prime Number Theorem to approximate
the average length of prime gaps. The theorem gives an
asymptotic form for the prime counting function pðnÞ,
which counts the number of primes less than some integer
n. According to this theorem (proved independently by
Hadamard (1896) and de la Valle Poussin (1896)),

pðnÞ




1
X

k!n

k¼0

ðln nÞ

kþ1

n
n
2n
þ
þ
þ ...
ln n ðln nÞ2 ðln nÞ3

ð3Þ

It has been shown that summation of the ﬁrst three
terms in Eq. (3) is a better estimate for pðnÞ (Derbyshire
2004, pp. 116–117). Now, we can approximate the average
length of prime gaps below n as

gapav g ðNÞ 

n

pðnÞ



1
ln n

1
:
þ ðln1nÞ2 þ ðln2nÞ3

Table 2 shows the theoretical mean along with empirical mean and standard deviation of prime gaps for different
values of n. The last column of this table gives the ratio between empirical and theoretical mean which justiﬁes the
approximation above. Assume that P n denotes the nth
prime number. By choosing a spread factor, s, that approximates to gapav g ðNÞ for some N, we can obtain a set of numbers upper-bound by some prime number PpðNÞþ1 P N. We
denote this set as Q PpðNÞþ1 ;gapav g ðNÞ . Due to the high variation
in prime gaps with respect to gapav g ðNÞ the cardinality of
this set becomes less than N. Assume that using the same
spread factor (s ¼ gapav g ðNÞ), we ﬁnd a set of numbers,
Q PpðN0 Þ ;s such that jQ PpðN0 Þ ;s j is the smallest number greater
than or equal to N. Similarly, by choosing some values larger than gapav g ðNÞ for spread factor s, we can have a set of
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8.2. Bit usage for prime method

Table 2
Prime gaps below the number n.
n

500
1000
2000
5000

Prime gap
l

Observed mean (l)

Observed stdev

gapav g

gapav g

5.29
5.96
6.61
7.48

3.11
3.55
4.50
5.30

5.12
5.82
6.52
7.44

1.03
1.02
1.01
1.01

numbers Q PpðN00 Þ ;s , where jQ PpðN00 Þ ;s j is the smallest number
greater than or equal to N. Clearly, P pðN0 Þ > PpðN00 Þ , which
makes the latter set more favorable in terms of bit requirements (as observed in Table 1). We use the following optimistic choice:

s P gapav g ðNÞ 

N

pðNÞ



1
ln N

1
:
þ ðln1NÞ2 þ ðln2NÞ3

¼ log2

m
pðN0 Þ

!
ðPpðN0 Þ  iÞ þ log2 ðm  sÞ;

i¼0

where m is the number of node IDs embedded per packet.
Then we increase s by one and determine the corresponding set of node IDs. After calculating the worst case
bit requirements for the new set, we compare the newly
calculated value with the current one. If the newly calculated set outperforms the current one in terms of worst
case bit requirements, we set the new set to be the current
one. We continue until the newly calculated set requires
more bits than the current one. Table 3 shows the comparison among the required number of bits for different values
of s with varying numbers of nodes and number of perpacket node IDs. For a particular number of nodes and
per-packet node IDs, the last column gives the best choice
for s (s ).
8. Bit budget
A ﬁxed budget of bits (Bbudget ) is available for embedding
provenance of at most m nodes within the meta-data of a
packet. We give the value of m for our three encoding
methods in this section.

log2X
pðN0 Þ1



ði ½pð2i Þ  pð2i1 Þ Þ

i¼2
log2 pðN 0 Þ1

0

þlog2 pðN Þ  ½pðN Þ  pð2

ð4Þ

For a network of size N, we ﬁrst calculate gapav g ðNÞ and
by setting s ¼ bgapav g ðNÞc, we pick a set Q PpðN0 Þ ;s such that
jQ PpðN0 Þ ;s j is the smallest number greater than or equal to
N. Considering the requirements for prime multiplication
and summation of offset, we estimate the worst case bit
requirements per packet as:
m1
Y

BPav g ðs; mÞ ¼log2 ðm  sÞ þ
0

7.2. Choice of spread factor

BPworst ðs; mÞ

In an N-node network, we can pessimistically pick a value of m such that BPworst ðm; s Þ 6 Bbudget . This does not guarantee the best usage of available bits since prime
multiplication of m node IDs does not always need a ﬁxed
number of bits (as in the case of rank approach) and
BPworst ðm; s Þ can hold more than m node IDs in many cases.
Hence, we consider average case bit requirements before
choosing an m for a particular bit budget. The average bit
requirements per packet are

!
Þ

:

Table 4 shows the average number of bits calculated for
different numbers of nodes and per-packet node IDs with
their corresponding s . We choose an m such that
BPav g ðs ; m  1Þ 6 Bbudget 6 BPav g ðs ; m Þ. For example, in a
1000-node network with 40 bits available for provenance
embedding,
we
choose
m
to
be
4
since
BPav g ð5; 3Þ 6 40 6 BPav g ð7; 4Þ (Table 4). This choice provides
the opportunity to embed more node IDs per packet on
the average.
8.3. Bit usage for ﬁngerprint method
In an N-node network, the bit requirements for embedding m IDs per packet can be expressed as

BF ðr; mÞ



¼ b þ log2 m þ k;

r ¼ 1;

ðr  1Þb þ log2 m þ rk;

r > 1;

ð5Þ

where r is the number of partitions in the provenance buffer, k is the number of bits required for each ﬁngerprint and
b is the number of bits required to represent one node ID.
We need to choose an m and r such that BF ðr; mÞ 6 Bbudget .
Here, r ¼ 1 denotes the non-partitioned case, where the entire provenance buffer can be regarded as a single partition.
Assuming a false positive probability of 2 ;  P 0, from
Eq. (2),

k ¼ 2ðx  1Þlog2 f þ log2 b þ log2 x þ 

ð6Þ

where m ¼ ðrx  r þ 1Þ.
First, we consider the case when r ¼ 1, which leads to
x ¼ m. Then, combining (5) and (6) we have,

2ðm  1Þlog2 f þ 2log2 m 6 Bbudget  b  log2 b  :

ð7Þ

Similarly, considering r > 1, we have

rð2ðx  1Þlog2 f þ log2 x þ b þ log2 b þ Þ þ log2 ðrx  r þ 1Þ
8.1. Bit usage for rank method
In an N-node network, bit requirements for the rank
method are BR ðmÞ ¼ m  log2 N þ log2 m, where, the ﬁrst
term on the right hand side indicates the required number
of bits to embed m ranks, and the second term accounts for
the counter that tracks the number of embedded ranks.
Thus, we choose the largest m such that BR ðmÞ 6 Bbudget .

6 Bbudget þ b:
ð8Þ
We determine the maximum value of m for different
values of r P 1 using the above two equations. Decision
makers are left to choose the appropriate pair of ðr; mÞ
based on the rate of link failure or changes, and the
average fan-out of the network. In Table 5, we consider
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Table 3
Worst case bit requirements for varying number of nodes, per-packet node IDs, and choice of s.
s ¼ bgapav g c þ 2

s ¼ bgapav g c þ 3

s ¼ bgapav g c þ 4

P max

Bits

P max

Bits

P max

Bits

P max

Bits

P max

Bits

613
1307
2683
6779
613
1307
2683
6779
613
1307
2683
6779

32
36
40
44
43
47
51
56
52
57
62
70

587
1229
2477
6367
587
1229
2477
6367
587
1229
2477
6367

33
36
39
43
42
47
51
57
51
57
63
70

563
1163
2377
6079
563
1163
2377
6079
563
1163
2377
6079

33
36
39
43
42
46
51
57
52
57
63
69

547
1109
2269
5857
547
1109
2269
5857
547
1109
2269
5857

33
36
39
43
43
47
51
57
52
57
62
69

521
1063
2213
5669
521
1063
2213
5669
521
1063
2213
5669

33
36
39
44
43
47
51
56
52
57
62
69

7
7
7
7

Avg

s

36.16
40.53
45.14
51.11

6
6
6
11

r
Avg
44.35
49.9
55.81
62.4

a 5000-node network with average fan-out f ¼ 4; b ¼ 13
bits, and  ¼ 5 to show the possible choices for ðr; mÞ
where x indicates maximum number of node IDs
contained in each partition. Note that fanout should be
restricted so that excessive energy consumption at the
junction node does not partition the network [35]. We
also compare the theoretically calculated average bit
requirements of the ﬁngerprint method with the two
other encoding schemes in Fig. 7. Clearly, the ﬁngerprint
method requires fewer bits than the other methods, as
the value of N and m increase.

5
5
10
10
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
11

1
2
3
4

Bbudget ¼ 32

Bbudget ¼ 64

Bbudget ¼ 128

m

x

m

x

m

x

2
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

2
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

9
7
n.a.
n.a.

9
4
n.a.
n.a.

25
21
16
9

25
11
6
3

70

5000 Nodes
1000 Nodes
500 Nodes

60
50
40
30
20
10
0

m=2

m=3

m=4

Fingerprint

s

27.82
31.25
34.5
38.99



Rank

Avg

m¼5

Prime



Fingerprint

5
5
10
10

m¼4

Rank

s
500
1000
2000
5000



Prime

m¼3

Fingerprint

N

s

Table 5
Choosing ðr; mÞ for different bit budgets in a 5000-node network with
b ¼ 13 and  ¼ 5.

Rank

Table 4
Average case bit requirements for varying numbers of nodes and per-packet
node IDs with s .

Prime

5
5
6
7
5
5
6
7
5
5
6
7

s ¼ bgapav g c þ 1

Fingerprint

500
1000
2000
5000
500
1000
2000
5000
500
1000
2000
5000

s ¼ bgapav g c

Rank

3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5

gapav g

Prime

N

Average number of bits

m

m=5

Number of IDs embedded per packet

9. Simulations
We conduct simulations using TOSSIM [36] for networks with hop counts ranging from 5 to 31, and number
of nodes ranging from 5 to 500. For energy analysis, we
use POWERTOSSIMZ [37] which uses the micaz energy
model. We do not consider energy consumption related
to CPU computations since TOSSIM cannot capture CPU
usage [37]. However, all nodes other than the base station
only perform encoding operations which have low computational complexity and are unlikely to draw signiﬁcant CPU power. A base station with no resource
constraints can perform the decoding operations, e.g.,
prime factorization, for a moderate number of nodes in
reasonable time. We compare the performance of the
encoding schemes of PPF with the following two variants
of probabilistic packet marking as they are the closest to
our approach (though they were designed for wired IP
networks):

Fig. 7. Average bit requirements for per packet provenance in networks
of different sizes. (Stacked data along a single column is given in relative
values that need to be added to get the absolute values of each textured
bar.)

 PPM [13,14]: The most basic probabilistic packet marking scheme which embeds one node ID per packet and
uses a distance ﬁeld to track the position of the embedded node ID on the forwarding path from the source to
the base station.
 PPM with network coding [24,25]: Incorporates network coding with packet marking to embed a linear
combination of a probabilistically chosen set of connected node IDs per packet. This scheme also uses a distance ﬁeld to track the position of linearly combined
node IDs on the forwarding path from the source to
the base station.
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Since PPM and PPM + NC are designed for IP traceback, we need to adapt them for wireless sensor networks. PPM will use 16 bits for embedding a single
node ID (per TinyOS) and 8 bits for the distance ﬁeld.
PPM + NC computes a linear combination of node IDs
over F 216 (since node IDs are 16 bits). The coefﬁcients
used to compute linear combinations are chosen over
F 22 . PPM + NC uses the rest of the bit budget to embed
the coefﬁcients and a counter that tracks number of participating nodes in the linear combination. We note that,
our implementation of PPM + NC is a slightly improved
version of the original one. In the original version of
PPM + NC, a packet received at the base station does not
contain any linear combination of node IDs if no intermediate nodes mark the packet. We modiﬁed this so that a
packet received at the base station contains a linear combination of the ﬁrst few node IDs even if no intermediate
nodes mark the packet.
9.1. Performance metrics
The following performance metrics are considered to
evaluate our proposed schemes:
 Number of transmitted packets: The total number of
packets transmitted by all nodes on a path from a particular source to the base station before complete provenance is constructed for that path.
 Aggregate energy consumption: The total energy consumed (in mJ) by all nodes that participated in encoding
provenance of a path from a particular source to the
base station.
 Decoding error: The percentage of node IDs that cannot
be decoded due to link changes or false positive rates (if
any).
9.2. Simulation setup
All experiments are performed using a transmission
rate of 250 kbps, the default transmission rate of the
micaz mote, where every data-generating sensor sends
data towards the base station every 2 s. The probability
1
for embedding a node ID is p ¼ 25
. Before starting data
transmission, the following initialization steps are
performed:
 Every node is assigned a node ID from the appropriate
set Q P;s (discussed in Section 7).
 Every node computes and stores the lookup table necessary to compute Rabin ﬁngerprints.
 The sender node sends 500 dummy packets towards the
base station to ensure convergence of the routing protocol CTP. These packets are discarded at the base station
and thus not used in the provenance construction
process.
All results are averaged over 1000 runs, and we ﬁnd the
standard deviation to be extremely small. Unless otherwise stated, we use the above default values in our
simulations.
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9.3. Random topology
We start with a randomly deployed 500-node network
where the position of the source node is varied to simulate
paths of different hops (from 5 to 31). The channel and
radio parameters for this topology are listed in Table 6.
The nodes have an average noise ﬂoor of 106 dBm, a standard deviation of 4.0 dB for the white Gaussian noise, and a
low level of asymmetry. The network has very low rate of
link changes. We place the same constraint on usable bits
(32 bits) for provenance embedding per packet on all
schemes.
Fig. 8(a) shows the number of packets required to construct provenance for increasing numbers of hops from a
single source to the base station. The results reveal that
all three schemes of PPF have identical performance in this
case, since they can embed only 3 node IDs (on average)
per packet using 32 bits. However, they require at least
33% fewer packets than both PPM variants. The original
PPM scheme requires a large number of packets since it
embeds a single node ID per packet. In contrast, PPM + NC
uses 16 bits (out of 32) for the linear combination, 8 bits
for the distance ﬁeld, 6 bits for storing coefﬁcients, and
the remaining 2 bits to count the coefﬁcients used. Thus
it embeds a linear combination of 3 node IDs in a packet.
However, in order to construct a forwarding path of length
d hops, PPM + NC converges upon reception of d unique
linear combinations of node IDs, whereas PPF requires d
different node IDs.
Fig. 8(b) compares the aggregate energy consumption
for the two PPM variants and PPF-Prime (the PPF method
that requires the lowest number of packets for a 32-bit
budget). PPF with a 32-bit budget consumes at least 30%
less energy than the PPM variants.
We perform the same experiment in a 5000-node network with a 64-bit budget. We skip PPM since it embeds
only one node ID per packet and requires the same number of packets. Since TOSSIM does not scale to 5000
nodes, we randomly assign node IDs from a set of 5000
numbers and take the average over experimental results
of several TOSSIM runs. Fig. 8(c) shows that the prime
method requires fewer packets than the rank method,
while the ﬁngerprint method outperforms both in this
case. The reason is that with a 64-bit budget, the ﬁngerprint method (r ¼ 2) embeds 7 node IDs per packet with
a low false positive rate (< 0:001), whereas the prime
and rank methods embed 5 and 4 node IDs on average,
respectively. Though PPM + NC can embed a linear combination of up to 17 node IDs (16 bits for linear combination ﬁeld, 8 bits for distance ﬁeld, 34 bits for the
coefﬁcients and 5 bits for the counter ﬁeld), it still
requires more packets than the efﬁcient PPF schemes.
Speciﬁcally, PPF-Fingerprint requires at least 45% fewer
packets than PPM + NC.
Fig. 9 compares the aggregate energy consumption for
PPM + NC and PPF methods with a 64-bit budget in a 25hop network. We ﬁnd that PPM + NC consumes less energy
with respect to PPF-Rank and the percentage of energy
gain is only 17 in this case. The best PPF scheme (PPF-Fingerprint in this case) reduces energy consumption by 46%
with respect to PPM + NC. Further, PPF with a 64-bit
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Table 6
TOSSIM channel and radio parameters for different topologies.
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Fig. 9. Energy consumption for 25-hop network with 64-bit budget.

budget reduces energy consumption by more than 60%,
compared to its 32-bit counterpart.

To understand the simulation results, we consider a
10  10 grid network. The source node transmits 20,000
packets towards the base station. Fig. 10(b) shows the distribution of the number of changes in hop count for successive packets received at the base station (after discarding
out-of-order packets). About 98% of the packets that experienced topological changes have exactly a 1-hop difference with respect to the path followed by the preceding
packet. Fig. 10(c) shows the distribution of the number of
packets received at the base station between two consecutive groups of topological changes. The number of packets
between two topological changes signiﬁcantly varies. In
the 80% case, at least 50 packets are being received at the
base station between two changes. Thus, we ﬁnd that once
there is a topological change, it affects a small number of
hops on the path from the source to the base station. After
that, the path remains stable for large number of packets.
This is why PPF with topological change handling incurs
negligible overhead without affecting convergence rate.

9.4. Grid network topology
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9.5. Varying link change rates
We have observed that incorporating the topological
change handling scheme into PPF helps track changing
paths. In such scenarios, the ﬁngerprint method provides
additional resistance to decoding error over other encoding
methods, since it transmits a large provenance subgraph
with smaller partitions as discussed in Section 4.3.2.
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We use highly asymmetric grid topologies to demonstrate the effect of topological changes on our proposed
schemes. The radio and channel parameters used for these
topologies are shown in Table 6. The grid dimensions are
varied from 2  2 to 10  10, while node density is kept
constant with nodes spaced 2.0 m apart. The source node
is positioned at coordinate (0, 0) and the base station is located at the upper rightmost corner of the grid. The average hop count is observed to range from 2 to 19 for grid
dimensions of 2–10. The bit budget considered here is
64 bits.
We combine PPF with the topological changes handling
scheme discussed in Section 4.4, and compare the number
of packets required by PPF-Rank, PPF-Fingerprint, and PPFPrime. We do not consider PPM variants in this simulation
since they do not handle topological changes. Fig. 10(a) depicts the simulation results. PPF-Fingerprint outperforms
other methods as the grid dimensions (and hence the
hop count) increase. It is interesting to note that PPF
methods combined with topological change handling
perform similar to the basic PPF methods (without the
topological change handling) in a network with negligible
link changes.
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Fig. 8. Comparison among different encoding schemes of PPF and PPM variants in a random topology. (a) Provenance construction with 32-bit budget. (b)
Aggregate energy consumption with 32-bit budget. (c) Provenance construction with 64-bit budget.
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9.6. Trust framework and provenance similarity
We integrate PPF with a provenance-based trust framework [9] to iteratively compute trust scores. To evaluate
the performance of the trust framework integrated with
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PPF, we use a 7  7 grid with the same channel and radio
parameters as the grid topology (see Table 6). Five nodes
(2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) generate data items every 1 s and the rest
of the nodes act as forwarders. Each of the data generator
nodes send 2000 data items. The top right most node
(49) in the grid works as the base station which computes
trust score over each collection of data items that have
same sequence number but are generated from different
originators. Fig. 12 shows that the trust score calculated
using PPF evolves correctly as soon as the entire provenance is constructed at the base station. PPF accuracy in
trust score calculation is similar to the traditional approach
that includes every node ID on the forwarding path in the
provenance.
We use the same 7  7 grid network with varying ETX
threshold (thetx ) to investigate the effectiveness of our
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Fig. 12. Trust scores of data items.
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To observe the effect of partitioning ﬁngerprints, we
study the decoding error of the ﬁngerprint method with respect to the rate of link changes. Here, decoding error denotes the percentage of node IDs that cannot be decoded
due to link changes or false positive rates, where rate of link
changes indicates the average number of link changes per
unit time. We artiﬁcially introduce link failures and associated path changes that are randomly distributed over a
time window of 200 s along a 30-hop path.
Fig. 11(a) shows that as link changes increase, the ﬁngerprint method with two partitions (r ¼ 2) has a decoding
error lower than the non-partitioned case because of its
low sensitivity to topological changes. However, the ﬁngerprint method with r ¼ 3 suffers from a false positive rate of
about 0.16 with a 64-bit budget in this particular experiment, and performs worse than the r ¼ 2 case in the presence of low rate of link changes (when decoding error due
to link changes is small). With a high rate of link changes,
the case of r ¼ 3 shows a small improvement over the r ¼ 2
case, but a relatively higher false positive rate in a dense
network will nulliﬁes that improvement (as indicated in
Table 5). Fig. 11(b) shows the effect of the decoding error
in constructing provenance. The ﬁngerprint method with
r ¼ 2 converges with a fewer number of packets even in
the presence of a high rate of link changes. The false positive rate is negligible.
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Fig. 11. Provenance construction with varying rate of link changes. (a) Decoding error. (b) Number of packets required.
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120

Number of packets

controlled routing scheme proposed in Section 6.2. We keep
the data values reported from the originator nodes ﬁxed
over different packets to solely focus on the role of provenance similarity.
Fig. 13(a) and (b) shows the provenance of the data
items generated from node 2, 3, and 4 for thetx ¼ 10 and
thetx ¼ 30 respectively. It is seen that data items have
shared provenance with lower thetx and different provenance with higher thetx . Fig. 13(c) shows the resulting effect
of provenance dissimilarity on the trustworthiness of data
items: higher dissimilarity in provenance increase the
trustworthiness of data items. Finally, Fig. 14 shows the
trade-off between provenance dissimilarity and transmission overhead. As the ETX threshold, thetx , increases, dissimilarity among provenance, qd , increases at the
expense of increased transmission overhead. This allows
decision makers to select an appropriate thetx value based
on the security requirements and network conditions of
the system.
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Fig. 16. Provenance construction in a linear testbed.

10. Testbed experiments
We ported the implementation of PPF to the TelosB
platform. Our motes have an 8 MHz TI MSP430 micro-controller, 2.4 GHz radio, 10 kB RAM, and 1 MB ﬂash for data
logging. We also ported the implementation of PPM and
PPM with network coding to this platform. We consider
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Fig. 17. Placement of nodes in a Purdue University classroom in a multihop random topology. (a) Partial view of testbed. (b) Coordinates of nodes.

packets required to construct provenance. As the hop
count increases, PPF outperforms both PPM variants and
reduces the number of required packets by more than
33%. This result validates the gain that we achieved in TOSSIM simulations.
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Fig. 18. Number of packets required to construct provenance in the
random topology testbed experiment.

the same performance metrics as in Section 9.1 to compare
with PPF.
10.1. Experimental setup
We placed battery-powered TelosB motes in an indoor
environment. When necessary, we controlled the transmission power of the motes to ensure multihop communication in the network. We assign node IDs from the set
Q P;s . All nodes are started and stopped at the same time.
The source node sends out packets every 500 ms. The prob1
ability of embedding a node ID is set to 25
. Before actual
data transmission starts, every node computes and stores
the lookup table necessary to compute Rabin ﬁngerprints
and the source node sends 500 dummy packets to ensure
convergence of the routing protocol CTP. All results are
averaged over 500 runs.
10.2. Multihop linear topology
We construct a 3.5 m  1.5 m topology consisting of
15 TelosB sensors deployed linearly in an apartment room.
We used the lowest transmission power level to ensure
multihop communication. Fig. 15 shows the coordinates
of the nodes in the testbed, where nodes are labeled
1–15. We used node 1 as base station and connected it to
a laptop through a USB cable. A Java application running
on the laptop received the packets and performed the
real-time decoding process. We conducted different sets
of experiments by varying hop counts from 5 to 15. The
bit budget considered here is 32 bits.
We compare PPF-prime (the best scheme for the 32-bit
budget as seen from our simulation results) with PPM and
PPM with network coding. Fig. 16 plots the number of

We construct a 9.5 m  1.6 m topology consisting of
20 TelosB sensors deployed randomly in a Purdue University classroom. We used transmission power level 1 to create relatively weak wireless links. Fig. 17 shows the
coordinates of the nodes in the testbed, where nodes are
labeled 1–20. Node 2 is selected as the source and node 1
(connected to a laptop) is chosen as the base station. The
hop count from the source to the base station was observed to be between 9 and 11. Since PPF schemes with a
32-bit budget exhibit almost identical performance for
such a small hop count, we consider a 64-bit budget for
this experiment.
We compare PPF-Rank, PPF-Prime and PPF-Fingerprint
in the presence of topological changes. Fig. 18 depicts the
average number of packets required to construct provenance for all three schemes. It is observed that PPF-Prime
and PPF-Fingerprint perform better than PPF-Rank. Their
performance is similar to basic PPF schemes in a network
of 9–11 hops with negligible rate of link changes.
11. Conclusions
We have presented an energy-efﬁcient provenance
transmission and construction approach for large-scale
multi-hop wireless sensor networks, based on the idea of
probabilistic incorporation of node identities. We adapt
the Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) approach for IP
traceback, and propose three provenance encoding methods with a space constraint on the size of provenance data
in each packet. We analyze the suitability of the methods
based on the network size and bit budget via mathematical
approximations and numerical methods. In contrast to
PPM, our proposed approach requires fewer packets to
construct network-wide provenance, and signiﬁcantly reduces the aggregate energy consumption of the network,
as demonstrated via both simulations and testbed experiments. We also incorporate a simple but robust scheme
into PPF to handle topological changes. PPM variants do
not consider such changes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PPF in highly dynamic and asymmetric networks
using simulation and testbed experiments. PPF integration
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with a provenance-based trust framework reveals no degradation in accuracy of trust scores. We also explore the
trade-off between trustworthiness or provenance dissimilarity of data items and transmission overhead. In this regard, we propose a solution to provide decision makers
with a tunable parameter to control the extent of provenance dissimilarity and transmission overhead. In our future work, we will study how well a complete trust
framework can detect and react to different attacks and
failure scenarios.

Observe that the ﬁrst part of the above equation can be
determined by shifting the previous ﬁngerprint,
RFð½b1 . . . bl Þ to left by 8 bits with the leading 8 bits removed and then XORing the output with the input byte:
ð½r 1 . . . rz  8Þ ð½r 1 . . . r8  zÞ ð½blþ1 . . . blþ8 Þ. The second part is determined by a modulo operation where the
dividend is the leading 8 bits of the ﬁngerprint,
RFð½b1 . . . bl Þ shifted to left by z bits and the divisor is
M : ð½r1 . . . r8  zÞ mod M. By combining the two parts,
ﬁngerprint can be determined as,
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ð½r 1 . . . r 8

ð½blþ1 . . . blþ8 Þ

ðð½r 1 . . . r 8  zÞ modMÞ

¼ ð½r 1 . . . r z  8Þ ð½blþ1 . . . blþ8 Þ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
part 1

ðð½r 1 . . . r 8  zÞ ðð½r 1 . . . r 8  zÞmod MÞÞ:
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ
ﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}

Appendix A. Implementation of ﬁngerprint calculation

part 2

Assume that M denotes the irreducible polynomial of
degree z required to calculate the ﬁngerprint. We show
how the ﬁngerprint of the string ½b1 . . . bt can be calculated
by extending it one bit at a time. For an arbitrary length l,
we can write,

RFð½b1 . . . bl Þ ¼ ðb1 al1 þ b2 al2 þ . . . bl Þ mod M
¼ r1 az1 þ r2 az2 þ . . . rz

Since M and z are known beforehand, part 2 of the
above equation can be looked up from a pre-computed table (of size <4 KB) which contains the values of the expression ðð½r1 . . . r 8  zÞ ðð½r1 . . . r8  zÞ mod MÞÞ for all
possible values of the bits ½r1 . . . r8 . Thus the ﬁngerprint
of a bit string extended by 1 byte can be calculated using
only 1 shift and 2 XOR operations.

Now if we extend ½b1 . . . bl by one bit blþ1 , we have,

RFð½b1 . . . bl jjblþ1 Þ ¼ RFð½b1 . . . blþ1 Þ
¼ ðRFðb1 . . . bl Þa þ blþ1 Þ mod M
¼ ðRFðb1 . . . bl Þa þ blþ1 Þ mod M
¼ ððr 1 az1 þ . . . r z Þa þ blþ1 Þ mod M
¼ r 2 az1 þ . . . r z a þ blþ1 þ ðr 1 az Þ mod M:
Observe that ak mod M ¼ ak  M ¼ M  ak . So
ak mod M is equivalent to M with the leading coefﬁcient
removed. Computing the ﬁngerprint of A extended by blþ1
consists of one shift left operation with blþ1 as the input bit
and r 1 as the output bit, and then, conditioned upon r1 ¼ 1,
a bit-wise XOR operation, the second operand being M
with the leading coefﬁcient removed. In this way, we can
extend the bit string up to length t to calculate the desired
ﬁngerprint. Since each bit extension requires only a constant number of shift and XOR operations, the time complexity of calculating the ﬁngerprint is linear in number
of bits of the input string.
We further show that time complexity of ﬁngerprint
calculation can be improved by extending a byte at a time
and using a lookup table. If we extend ½b1 . . . bl by one byte
½blþ1 ; blþ2 ; . . . blþ7 ; blþ8 , we have

RFð½b1 . . . bl jj½blþ1 ; blþ2 ; . . . blþ7 ; blþ8 Þ ¼ RFð½b1 . . . blþ8 Þ
¼ ðRFðb1 . . . bl Þa8 þ blþ1 a7 þ . . . þ blþ8 Þ mod M
¼ ððr 1 az1 þ r2 az2 þ . . . rz Þa8 þ blþ1 a7 þ . . . blþ7 a
þ blþ8 Þ mod M
¼ ðr 9 az1 þ r 10 az2 þ . . . rz a8 þ blþ1 a7 þ . . . blþ8 Þ
þ ðr 1 azþ7 þ . . . r 7 azþ1 þ r 8 az Þ mod M
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